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ABSTRACT
To protect their digital assets from malware attacks, most users
and companies rely on anti-virus (AV) software. But AVs’ protec-
tion is a full-time task and AVs are engaged in a cat-and-mouse
game where malware, e.g., through obfuscation and polymorphism,
denial of service attacks and malformed packets and parameters,
try to circumvent AV defences or make them crash. On the other
hand, AVs react by complementing signature-based with anomaly
or behavioral detection, and by using OS protection, standard code,
and binary protection techniques. Further, malware counter-act,
for instance by using adversarial inputs to avoid detection, et cetera.
This paper investigates two novel moves for the malware side.
The first one consists in simulating mouse events to control AVs,
namely to send them mouse “clicks” to deactivate their protection.
We prove that many AVs can be disabled in this way, and we call
this class of attacks Ghost Control. The second one consists in con-
trolling high-integrity white-listed applications, such as Notepad,
by sending them keyboard events (such as “copy-and-paste”) to
perform malicious operations on behalf of the malware. We prove
that the anti-ransomware protection feature of some AVs can be
bypassed if we use Notepad as a "puppet" to rewrite the content of
protected files as a ransomware would do. Playing with the words,
and recalling the cat-and-mouse game, we call this class of attacks
Cut-and-Mouse.
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1 INTRODUCTION
To protect IT assets, distinct classes of basic security practices are
often provided to the end users depending on their usage scenario.
For instance, home users are instructed to always update their
operating system (OS) and applications; corporate administrators
are required to employ some form of user training to teach users,
e.g., how not to click on e-mails that look suspicious; organizations
are recommended to use firewalls to protect their networks from
remote attackers. However, it is often the case that the first security
recommendation given to all classes of users is to install an anti-
virus (AV) on their devices. In fact, AVs are believed to be one of
the best protection solutions, specifically against malware; AVs are
installed in most user computers and companies, and are implicitly
trusted by most users, and are part of the trusted computing base1.
It goes without saying that, while AVs do offer protection, they
cannot catch all malware. Not only there might be missing signa-
tures in their database [2], by over the years malware authors have
spent great effort in trying to evade AVs detection, e.g., through
obfuscation and polymorphism [35] or evasion [4], or by disabling
or crashing the AV [17, 33]. This is the classical cat-and-mouse game
between AVs and malware, in which the first class of attacks (e.g.,
polymorphism) is typically mitigated by some form of anomaly or
behavioral detection [8, 34, 34] while the second one (e.g., evasion)
is mitigated by making the AV more difficult to exploit, such as
through OS protection and standard binary integrity protection
techniques [1]. The battle continues on, as now malware can try
and bypass AV behavioral detection using, for instance, adversarial
inputs [7], and AVs will incorporate robust mechanisms to mitigate
the effects of these inputs [10, 14].
In relation to this cat-and-mouse game, we raise two questions.
(a) Can an attacker instrument a malware to send mouse and key-
board events to AVs to deactivate their functionalities? In particular,
we wonder whether off-the-shelf AVs can be disabled by a malicious
program’s mimicking user inputs (through synthesized keyboard
and mouse events) to turn off, or temporarily freeze, their opera-
tions, especially those aimed at protecting from malware attacks.
In theory, we would expect that, to protect from spoofed inputs,
AVs enforce some forms of integrity and authentication checks on
inter-process communications and user access control to verify the
legitimacy of the received inputs. Instead, in our experiments, we
found that most of the AVs can be easily disabled by a malware sim-
ulating mouse clicks, in particular, AVs are stoppable by spoofing
requests to their main graphical interface. (b) Can we extend this
class of attacks to control a trusted application like a “puppet” and
instruct it to perform malicious operations on behalf of a malware
itself ? To this end, we tested whether a ransomware can circumvent
1Most AVs require kernel-level privileges to perform some of their operations.
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the Protected Folders feature of AVs by exploiting and controlling
Notepad, a trusted application, to bypass the restrictions in place
and encrypt files in the Protected Folders.
These two research questions are linked to a more fundamental
issue about human-to-process event authentication. In question (a), in
fact, the matter is whether AVs do authenticate inputs (supposedly
coming from hardware operated by a user) as really coming from
the user’s operating the hardware. In question (b), the matter is
less direct and concerns recognizing inputs as authentically coming
from the user events that are generated by a user application. Since
applications may have security clearance, source authentication
becomes necessary to recognize events that instead are generated
by a malicious software, not the user, controlling the application.
Both are hard problems and the vulnerabilities that we illustrate in
this paper show how critical are the attacks that root to a failure in
this authentication process.
Problem Statement: This paper claims that the following prob-
lems exist in current malware mitigation:
(P-i) Several AV programs contain a critical flaw that allows unau-
thorized agents to turn off their protection features. In detail,
the real-time scanning service of some AVs can be disabled
by malware. This will make victims exposed to several kinds
of cyber threats, especially those originated from malware.
(P-ii) The Protected Folders solution provided by AV vendors suffers
from design weaknesses. In fact, a small set of whitelisted ap-
plications is granted privileges to write to protected folders.
However, whitelisted applications are not protected from
being misused by other applications. This trust is therefore
unjustified, since a malware can perform operations on pro-
tected folders by using whitelisted applications as interme-
diaries. In particular, ransomware might be able to exploit
some of the whitelisted applications to change the contents
of files, thus to encrypt user data.
In this paper we discuss two classes of attacks that prove these
problems currently exist, the first one being Ghost Control, aimed
at crafting stealthy mouse events to disable AVs (P-i), while the
second one is Cut-and-Mouse, aimed at simulating keyboard events
to control trusted applications (P-ii).
1.1 Ethical Issues and Responsible Disclosure
This research may have ethical concerns of dual use. We there-
fore adhere to an ethical code of conduct and responsible disclo-
sure [19, 23]. We do not disclose the names of the AV companies,
nor publicly share any piece of software that can be used to exploit
the vulnerabilities reported in this paper. We have dutifully engaged
with the affected AV companies to inform them about our findings
by following responsible disclosure practices.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we recap the essential background information to
understand our attacks. We begin with explaining the ransomware
mitigation in current antivirus solutions. Next, we summarize exist-
ing measures provided by Windows OS to protect processes from
unauthorized modifications.
2.1 Ransomware Defense in AVs
In response to the rise of ransomware threat, AV vendors have
developed dedicated ransomware detection modules that are either
integrated into their products or as standalone tools. While internal
mechanisms of AVs are not publicly documented, the available
options in most of AV configuration interfaces suggest that these
anti-ransomware components are primarily based on whitelists.
Similar to the virus signature databases, these lists are maintained
by AV vendors by default, though, users can also add additional
applications that they trust.
The vendor of Windows OS, Microsoft, has also developed a
specific anti-ransomware solution, called Controlled Folder Access,
which has been included in Windows 10 Fall Creators Update (Ver-
sion 1709) and Windows Server 2019. Ransomware Protection, in-
tegrated into Windows Defender antivirus, controls which appli-
cations have access to protected folders, a list of directories that
includes system folders and default directories such as Documents
and Pictures. Users can also add further directories to the pro-
tected folder list in order to extend the coverage of protection. By
default, the decision of granting applications access to protected
folder is made by Windows, hence Microsoft, but users can also
allow specific applications to access the protected folders.
In this paper, we use the term trusted applications when referring
to the applications that has write access to protected folders, either
granted by AV vendor or added by the user.
2.2 Process Protection via Integrity Levels
Computer architecture we use today is designed to run multiple
processes concurrently, that is, all running processes share the same
execution environment. To protect processes from malicious alter-
ations by other processes, Windows OS employs access control
mechanisms. Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC) is one of these
security features, which enables the OS to assign an Integrity Level
(IL) to a process: this value indicates the privilege level of that
process. MIC defines four values for IL, with the increasing privi-
leges: Low, Medium, High, and System. When a process attempts to
interact with another process, MIC checks IL of the initiator and
prevents if the target has higher IL. For example, injecting code to
another process using CreateRemoteThread or write data to the
memory of another process via WriteProcessMemory will fail if
the caller does not possess at least the same IL as the target.
Closely related to MIC, User Interface Privilege Isolation (UIPI)
is another security feature of Windows, which complements MIC
to prevent unauthorized process interactions. UIPI also utilizes ILs
and blocks window messages flowing from a process with lower
IL. For example, calls to SendMessage Application Programming
Interface (API) would fail if the caller has a lower IL than the target.
Specifically, UIPI prevents the Shatter attack that we review in §8.
3 THREAT MODEL
In the description of our attacks, we assume the system is protected
using the latest generation of AVs with specific modules against
ransomware, and with built-in anti-ransomware feature of the OS.
We assume the attacker is able to get access to a Windows system
with user privilege levels by either tricking the user into clicking
on a file (e.g., attached or linked in an email) or by exploiting a
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vulnerability in the victim’s system. Once the attacker has estab-
lished a foothold into the system, it will typically drop/download a
malware to perform malicious operations, however, the malware
will be blocked by an AV, or in the case of ransomware, encryption
of files in protected folders will be blocked by anti-ransomware
protected folder feature offered by Windows or some AVs. Hence-
forth, the focus of this paper is on how attackers can bypass AVs
and anti-ransomware protection modules, and in providing prac-
tical mitigation solutions, rather than in the problem of detecting
and protecting the system from remote attacks. This threat model
is sometimes referred as a 2nd stage attack, meaning an attacker
would need to have remote access to a victim’s computer, or have
installed a malicious application using one of the two previously
outlined alternatives (or through other means).
In this threat model, we will perform two attacks, which are
described in the next two sections: the first attack (Cut-and-Mouse)
is aimed at bypassing the protected folder feature to encrypt files
in protected folder, while the second one (Ghost Control) is aimed
at disabling AVs’ real time protection.
4 ENCRYPTING PROTECTED FOLDERS
In this section, we describe our attack, Cut-and-Mouse, which al-
lows ransomware to evade detection by anti-ransomware solutions,
which are based on protected folders, and to encrypt the victim’s
files. First, we investigate the root causes that leads to this attack.
Next, we give the attack details, and finally propose a practical
solution.
4.1 Disharmony Between UIPI and AVs
As explained in §2, anti-ransomware modules of commercial AV
software grant write access to trusted applications only. To ensure
this defense strategy cannot be easily bypassed, the trusted applica-
tions should be protected from any malicious modifications which
would be seen in a typical malware attack. For instance, as we report
the details in §6, current AVs detect when a malicious Dynamic-
Link Library (DLL) module is injected into a trusted application,
and suspend or kill its process. Similarly, UIPI, another protection
described in §2, protects processes that run with administrative
privileges from malware.
Nonetheless, we have discovered two entry points for an attack
which enables malware to bypass these defense systems, namely:
(E-i) UIPI is Unaware of Trusted Applications: UIPI filters simulated
inputs based on integrity levels, however, UIPI is agnostic of
the trust level assigned to applications, so it does not enforce
any policy in these cases: as shown in Fig. 1a, that means
that an attacker can send messages to trusted applications,
in particular to those that are allowed to read and write to
protected folders;
(E-ii) AVs Do Not Monitor Process Messages: AVs do not monitor syn-
thesized clicks or key press events flowing into the trusted
applications: as depicted in Fig. 1b, this means that a ran-
somware can bypass protected folder enforcement by send-
ing control messages to a trusted application.
These two entry points form a vulnerability that can enable
malware to perform practical attacks, such as that shown in Fig. 1c
where a ransomware can control a trusted application to perform
controlled write operations as to encrypt inaccessible protected
files. The attack is described in more detail in the next section.
(a) Ransomware’s messages to
high IL applications are blocked
by UIPI (top); but ransomware
can send messages to trusted ap-
plications (bottom).
(b) Ransomware’s write at-
tempts to protected files are
blocked by AVs (top); however,
sending messages to trusted
applications is allowed (bottom).
(c) Ransomware can control a trusted application to perform write
operations to protected files.
Figure 1: The disharmony between UIPI and AV software’s
protected folders mechanism, as described in (a) and (b), is
the root cause of the vulnerability which leads to the attack
depicted in (c).
4.2 Attack Overview
Using the vulnerability described in the previous section, ran-
somware can bypass anti-ransomware protection via controlling
a trusted application and encrypt the files of the victim, including
those stored in protected folders. To this end, for each file Ftarget ,
the ransomware performs the following tasks as depicted in Fig. 2.
Firstly, ransomware reads the contents of Ftarget , which is in a pro-
tected folder (1). This is perfectly legal: in fact, reading a protected
file is permitted by default2. The plaintext retrieved from Ftarget is
encrypted in ransomware’s own memory. The resulting ciphertext
is then encoded in a suitable encoding format, e.g., Base64 [13], and
copied into the system clipboard (2). Next, the ransomware launches
the Run window (3) to start a trusted application Apptrusted , with
the goal of controlling it. In this example,Apptrusted is Notepad as it
is typically trusted inWindows environments. In addition, Notepad
understands shortcuts for file and edit commands that ransomware
will send. Using the Run window, ransomware executes Apptrusted
with the argument Ftarget , so that the contents of Ftarget is loaded
into Apptrusted ’s window (4). Next, the data in Apptrusted ’s window
are selected, and overwritten with the clipboard data (the encrypted
data) with a paste command (5). Finally, Apptrusted is instructed by
the ransomware to save the modifications, and close the handle to
Ftarget (6). All interactions in Steps 3-6 are carried out by sending
keyboard inputs which are synthesized programmatically by the
ransomware to control Apptrusted .
The combination of these actions effectively allows ransomware
to bypass the current protection methods of AVs that are aimed
explicitly at blocking ransomware. Therefore, by referring to the
2Some AVs also provide an optional, more strict access setting that, if activated, makes
AVs block the read requests from non-trusted applications.
ACSAC ’19, December 9–13, 2019, San Juan, PR, USA Ziya Alper Genç, Gabriele Lenzini, and Daniele Sgandurra
Ransomware
Windows Clipboard
Run Window
Trusted Application
e.g., Notepad
Protected Files
0 For Each File
1 Read File
Contents
3 Open Run Window
4 LaunchNotepad2
Copy to
Clipboard
5 Paste to Notepad
6 Save &Close File
Figure 2: Bypassing anti-ransomware protection of AVs by
using inputs programmatically synthesized by ransomware
to control a trusted application.
never-ending ‘cat-and-mouse’ game of detection/anti-detection and
anti-evasion/evasion among AVs and malware, and the usage of
simulated keyboard and mouse inputs, we have named this attack
Cut-and-Mouse. Algorithm 1 details the main steps of the Cut-and-
Mouse attack.
Algorithm 1 Cut-and-Mouse Attack: Exploit Trusted Apps with
Simulated Keyboard and Mouse Inputs to Write to Protected Fold-
ers.
1: function Control(Apptrusted ) ▷ Application to Control.
2: FileList ← EnumerateTargetFiles()
3: for all f ∈ FileList do
4: plainBytes ← f .ReadAllBytes()
5: encBytes ← Encrypt(plainBytes)
6: encodedText ← Base64(encBytes)
7: CopyToClipboard(encodedText)
8: Simulate(Run, Apptrusted < f >) ▷ Win+R
9: Simulate(SelectAll) ▷ Ctrl+A
10: Simulate(Paste) ▷ Ctrl+V
11: Simulate(Save) ▷ Ctrl+S
12: Simulate(Close) ▷ Alt+F4
13: return Success
In more detail, there are two steps that are required for the Cut-
and-Mouse attack to be successful. First, the step Open Run Window
(3) in Fig. 2 is needed to disguise the operation of starting a trusted
application as if it was executed on behalf of the user. If, instead,
Notepad is directly executed by the ransomware, AVs would block
write requests even if the rest of the attack is performed as described
previously. In fact, in this example, even if Notepad is a trusted
application (therefore allowed to write on protected folders), its
parent process would be the ransomware, which is not trusted
by the AVs, hence, write operations would be blocked. Secondly,
as noted in Footnote 2, the step Read File Contents depicted in (1)
in Fig. 2 can be blocked by AVs in some circumstances. For this
reason, this limitation (that of not being able to read file contents)
can be circumvented if ransomware exploits a trusted application
to access the content on behalf of the ransomware. For example,
ransomware could instruct Notepad to open the target file, and
then synthesize two keyboard press events for Ctrl+A (Select All)
and Ctrl+C (Copy), which would allow the ransomware to select all
the content of the file and copy it to the system clipboard. Since the
clipboard is shared between all running processes, ransomware can
easily obtain the clipboard contents. It should be noted that, though,
this technique might result in unrecoverable data loss with binary
encoded files, due to the the presence of non-printable characters
displayed by Notepad. However, ransomware can detect the content
of the file before deciding which file to encrypt.
4.3 Mitigation Strategy
As a simple yet effective countermeasure to protect AVs modules
against our Cut-and-Mouse attack, we suggest that trusted applica-
tions should not receive messages from non-trusted applications.
That is, AVs must intercept all the messages flowing to a trusted
process and block or discard the messages sent by non-trusted pro-
cesses. This countermeasure is analogous to what UIPI implements
to guarantee process privileges. It should be noted that, however,
UIPI is not provided with a whitelist of AVs: therefore, it cannot
enforce such a filtering in practice and this defense task should be
fulfilled by the AV programs.
We elaborate more on this strategy in §7, where we define a
requirement that a secure message filtering system should at least
have.
5 DISABLING ANTIVIRUS SOFTWARE
In this section, we describe how the simulation attack Cut-and-
Mouse described in §4 can also be effectively applied in other sce-
narios, and we also attempt to hypothesize how it can be used in
future attacks.
In the course of our analysis, we have found a surprisingly simple
utilization of synthesized mouse events technique, which would al-
low an attacker to deactivate some of themost popular AV programs.
We start by explaining the reasons for the presence of deactivation
functionalities in AVs. Next, we describe the steps to perform the
attack, investigate the weakness in detail, and propose a practical
solution to fix it.
5.1 Necessity of the AV Deactivation Function
Signature-based detection has been the primary defense method of
AVs, and naturally, this technique is efficient only against known
malware as it can be bypassed easily, e.g. by obfuscation/packing
and polymorphic malware. To minimize this limitation, nearly all
current AVs employ some heuristics to detect malware by monitor-
ing behaviors of processes and looking for anomalies. However, this
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functionality comes with a price: occurrences of false positives. In
the context of malware defense, false positive is the situation where
an AV software flags a benign executable as malware, and it usually
proceeds with termination of the associated process, hence inter-
rupting the user. For example, when a user installs a new software
package, the installer may write to system directories, modify the
Windows Registry and configure itself to run when the user logs in.
The behavioral decision engine of an AV may be confused by these
activities, which indeed might look suspicious as they are largely
used by malware. Therefore, an AV may prevent the software from
being installed correctly. Consequently, some vendors recommend
the users to turn off their AV temporarily for a successful installa-
tion of their benign application, for instance [27]. Moreover, some
special software may require AV to be disabled while running, for
instance [12]. As a result, AV companies provide users with a switch
that can be used to deactivate the real-time protection for different
periods of time, ranging from a short period, such as 2 minutes, to
longer periods, such as 2 hours, or until the computer reboots. Of
course, the ability to "freeze" an AV might lure attackers to abuse
this functionality to bypass malware detection, hence, AVs should
offer ways to ensure that this functionality can be disabled only by
authorized users.
5.2 Stopping Real-time Protection
In our second attack, Ghost Control, we show how an attacker can
disable the AV protection by simulating legitimate user actions
to activate the Graphical User Interface (GUI) of the AV program,
and then to "click" the turn-off button. The proposed attack com-
prises two phases. The first phase, Collect, is performed off-line
by the malware author. In this phase, the developer collects the
required pieces of information about the user events to be simulated
to successfully disable the AV. This set of information consists of
(i) x and y coordinates on the screen; (ii) which mouse button to
be simulated; and (iii) length of time to wait until the next menu
is available. Please note that the mouse coordinates should lie in
the correct area on the screen for this attack to work. In addition,
these values would change from victim to victim, or even in the
same host, as the screen dimensions vary or would differ under
various resolutions. Therefore, the malware author needs to collect
the correct locations of the menus of all the major AVs under dif-
ferent display settings to increase the effectiveness. For example,
this would require the attacker to install the target AVs in virtual
environments with different screen dimensions to collect the neces-
sary data. Once Collect phase is completed, malware authors embed
the information into the sample to be used during the attack (or,
alternatively, they store these pieces of information on a server and
deliver them on a request made by the malware).
The second phase of the attack, Control, is the actual malicious
step which starts immediately after the infection. On the victim
machine, Control begins the reconnaissance phase to determine the
installed AV product(s) and obtain the screen dimensions. Using
this information, Control prepares the event sequence to be simu-
lated to turn off the AVs, by using the information stored during
Collect phase, and synthesizes the required user inputs accordingly.
Alg. 2 illustrates the part of Ghost Control that is responsible for
the turning off of the installed AV program.
Algorithm 2 Ghost Control Attack: Disable Real-Time Protection
of AV with Simulated Events.
1: global EventSequenceDatabase
2: function TurnOffProtection
3: antivirus ← GetInstalledAV() ▷ AV to deactivate.
4: events ← GetEventSequenceFor(antivirus)
5: for all e ∈ events do
6: Simulate(e)
7: return Success
As a consequence, the range of functionalities that Ghost Control
enables tomalware authors is very large, some having a high impact:
for instance, once the real-time scanning is stopped, malware can be
instructed to use Ghost Control to drop and execute any malicious
program from its Command and Control (C&C) server.
5.3 Mitigation
In order to develop a robust defense against this vulnerability, we
need to understand the root causes behind this vulnerability. Our
analysis shows that there are two reasons why Ghost Control is able
to deactivate the shields of several AV programs:
(W-i) AV Interface with Medium IL. Processes related to the AV
main interfaces that manage these defense systems run in
such a way that they are accessible from processes that run
without administrative privileges. It is therefore possible
to send “messages” from any process to these process, e.g.,
mouse click events, without any restriction.
(W-ii) Unrestricted Access to Scan Component. The scanning com-
ponents of vulnerable AVs do not require the user to have
administrative rights to communicate to them, e.g., they can
receive a TURN_OFFmessage from any process. Consequently,
Control can initiate and control the reaction which involves
accessing this critical component of AVs.
(W-ii) is actually a more critical vulnerability than (W-i). In fact,
if an AV software has (W-ii), then malware can skip interacting
with the GUI of AVs through (W-i) to directly communicate with
the AV’s scanner component and send a TURN_OFFmessage. This is
in fact only a practical limitation: for instance, in our experiments
(see §6), we have noticed that AV12 employs CAPTCHA mecha-
nisms to verify that the user really wants to turn-off the protection.
Even if we assume the CAPTCHA is a solid measure against auto-
mated attacks3, however, malware can still bypass the CAPTCHA
verification by directly accessing the scanner component due to
(W-ii).
To mitigate the root causes of the failure of the affected AVs, we
propose the following solution:
(F-i) AV Interface with High IL. AVs should run the main GUI
interface with administrative privileges. By doing so, AVs
would not receive the the messages of Control or any other
malware since UIPI would drop the unauthorized messages.
(F-ii) Restricted Access to Scan Component. AVs should design and
develop their scan components in such a way that accessing
it would require the user to have administrative rights.
3We note that CAPTCHA can actually be bypassed using other means, e.g. with
CAPTCHA solving services, but they might not always be applicable.
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In the next section, we discuss and share the results of our ex-
periments, which show that (i) some AVs are vulnerable to Ghost
Control (ii) the proposed measures are actually employed by some
AVs that, therefore, are not vulnerable to the Ghost Control attack.
From that evidence, we conclude that (i) these attacks are able to
circumvent several off-the-shelf AVs (ii) the proposed mitigation is
both effective and practical to use in real-world systems.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To demonstrate the impact of the exploitation of the vulnerabilities
described in §4 and §5, we developed proof-of-concept prototype
of the attacks, and tested them against some commercial AVs. To
report our findings, we first describe the test environment.
6.1 Test Environment
We conducted all experiments on a Virtual Machine (VM) running
Windows 10 Pro x64 Version 1809 (OS Build 17763.437). After a
fresh installation of Windows 10 OS, we updated the system and
created a snapshot of a template VM. Next, in each run of the
experiment, we restored VM to the snapshot and installed the latest
version of the AV software to be tested (available at the time of this
writing), which was usually determined by the installer application
downloaded from the vendor’s website.
The list of the AV programs that wewould test in the experiments
was determined from the product list published by AV-TEST4, an
independent company which tests AV products of 34 vendors. Most
of the software that we decided to test are certified as "top product"
in the latest test results of AV solutions for Windows users, which is
available at [5]. In addition, we also added some other AV programs
to our test set due to their popularity. After the selection procedure,
our test set contained 13 AV programs, including most of the AV
products of notable vendors.
6.2 Bypassing Protected Folders Feature via
Simulated Inputs
In this section, we report the test results where Cut-and-Mouse
attack is run against AVs. Before we continue, we share the results
of some attacks that were detected by AVs.
6.2.1 Attacks Detected by AVs. We first verified whether AVs are
able to detect and block known attacks aimed at bypassing the
anti-ransomware module. In the first experiment, we injected a
malicious DLL into a trusted application, where the DLL would
start encrypting the default files protected by AVs. As expected, all
of the 13 AVs in our dataset detected this technique, and suspended
(or sometimes killed, e.g., AV13) the injected trusted application
before the first write operation, as DLL injection is one of the oldest
attack techniques.
The next experiment was aimed at maliciously controlling a
trusted application to save encrypted content to protected files. In
this attack, we instructed a ransomware program implemented in
C# language to launch the trusted application using Process.Start
method. As expected, this attack is also not effective as the trusted
application is created as a child process of the ransomware, which
is not trusted, and therefore blocked by AVs.
4AV-TEST, https://www.av-test.org
Lastly, we executed a ransomware with elevated privileges while
protected folders feature of AVs were active. The sample, instead of
using our Cut-and-Mouse technique, is designed to directly encrypt
and overwrite the files in Documents and Pictures folders. Again,
all AVs in our dataset detected the attack and blocked the malicious
operations, which shows that protected folders feature of AVs is
immune to ransomware having admin privileges.
In the next section, we describe the technical requirements for
the successful exploitation of Cut-and-Mouse attack, and our imple-
mentation.
6.2.2 Technical Requirements. Successfully performing Cut-and-
Mouse attack requires a trusted application that should be available
on the victim’s machine. Furthermore, this specific trusted applica-
tion should possess the capabilities to: (i) be started from command
line; (ii) accept file paths as argument; (iii) edit/manipulate files;
and (iv) receive inputs from clipboard. We have discovered that the
best candidate that fulfills all these requirements is the Notepad
application, since it is one of the most commonly-used built-in Win-
dows application, and it is digitally signed5, therefore, whitelisted
by AV programs. In addition, file size limit of Notepad is 56 MB on
Windows 7, while it can open documents with size more than 512
MB on Windows 8.1. To send data to from a ransomware sample to
Notepad application, we exploit Windows Clipboard, which stores
objects that can be shared between all running applications. The
memory area to store these objects are allocated using GlobalAlloc
function. On 32-bit systems, virtual memory of a process is limited
with 2GB, which also determines the maximum capacity of the
clipboard. This gives us a sufficiently large memory space to store
encrypted and encoded data, so makes the clipboard suitable to use
as a swap area in our attack.
6.2.3 Implementation. We implemented a prototype of Cut-and-
Mouse in C# language, using .NET Framework version 4.6.1. The pro-
totype synthesizes only keystrokes as input simulation, for which,
SendInput is employed.
Our prototype implements Alg. 1 and works as follows. First, all
of the files in the target directory are enumerated using Directory.
GetFiles, and the files with the target extensions are filtered.
Namely, in the experiments, we targeted the following file exten-
sions: .docx, .xlsx and .png. Next, using Clipboard.SetText,
ransomware copies the command attrib.exe -r targetPath\*.*
to the clipboard, where targetPath is replaced with the absolute
path of the target directory. We instructed the ransomware program
to simulate keystrokes Win+R to open the Run window, and Ctrl+V
and ENTER to run the copied command. This step ensures that the
read-only attribute was removed from the target files.
Next, for each file, our Cut-and-Mouse prototype proceeds as
follows. Firstly, the file is read using File.ReadAllBytes and then,
using AesCryptoServiceProvider, the content of the file is en-
crypted in memory. After this, the byte stream is converted into
printable text using Base64 encoding, and copied to the system
clipboard. As previously discussed, our prototype uses Notepad
as Apptrusted , so it executes Win+R command, sleeps 500ms while
waiting for the Run window to open, and then pastes the command
5The digital signature of Notepad, as is the case formany built-inWindows applications,
is not embedded in the binary but can be found in the appropriate catalog file.
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notepad.exe targetFile into the Runwindow,where targetFile
is replaced with the absolute path of Ftarget . At this step, the proto-
type sleeps for an additional 500ms to ensure that Notepadwindow
is opened – this window displays the contents of the file. Next, the
prototype sends the keystrokes Ctrl+A to select all the text in the
Notepad window and Ctrl+V to paste the clipboard data into it,
which replaces the selected content with the ciphertext. Here, the
prototype performs one final sleep of 500ms to ensure that all the
data are correctly pasted into Notepad. To save the file, Ctrl+S
command is sent to Notepad, which effectively overwrites the file
with the encrypted data. Finally, Alt+F4 command is sent to close
Notepad.
6.2.4 Test Results of Cut-and-Mouse Attack. After installing the
AV software on the VM snapshot, we placed decoy files in the Doc-
uments and Pictures folders of the user – these are both protected
folders, hence protected from ransomware attacks. Next, we run
our Cut-and-Mouse prototype and checked the effect of the attack
on the files.
The results of our tests are shown in the second column of Table 1.
In particular, the results demonstrate the effectiveness of the Cut-
and-Mouse attack, which was able to bypass seven AV programs
and encrypt the files in the protected folders. The other six AVs
were not tested against Cut-and-Mouse (denoted by n.t.), as they
contain a more critical vulnerability which we report in the next
section.
To the best of our belief, Cut-and-Mouse is a new attack that
controls legitimate applications for malicious purposes via simu-
lated user inputs. The evidence that even the latest AV products
cannot detect this attack suggests that this new attack type can
cause more damages if used by real-world attackers with different
–and possibly creative– ideas to perform powerful exploitation of
systems.
6.3 Controlling Real-Time Protection of AVs
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of our attack in §5, we imple-
mented the prototype of Ghost Control in C# language, using .NET
Framework version 4.6.1. To collect the coordinates of the mouse
on the screen, the prototype uses GetCursorPos() API. For synthe-
sizing keystrokes, mouse motions, and button clicks, SendInput()
API is used. Between each simulated mouse clicks, the prototype
sleeps for 500ms to ensure that the next menu on the GUI is avail-
able to be selected.
6.3.1 Collecting Coordinates to Disable AVs. After installing the tar-
get AV, we started Collect phase and performed cursor movements
towards the tray icon area as to select and click the AV icon6 and
used AV’s GUI to disable the real-time scanning using the provided
menus. During this procedure, we recorded the (x,y) coordinates of
the cursor and the types of clicks that we had performed until the
protection was disabled, i.e., AV’s security notification appeared.
For instance, the output of Collect while a real user disables AV8 on
a VM with screen resolution set to 4096x2022, is as follows:
6For the sake of proof-of-concept, we did not implement a function to detect AV’s
icon among the tray icons. Actual malware would need to do that, for example, by
checking window titles to find AV’s icon, but this is not a difficult routine.
Table 1: Evaluation of AV products. Check marks in Weak
Self Protection column denotes that the AV product was suc-
cessfully disabled by Ghost Control. No further test are per-
formed on AVs that are found to have weak self protection.
Check marks in Weak RW Detection column denotes that
our Cut-and-Mouse could bypass the AV product and en-
crypt the protected files.
Product Weak SelfProtection
Weak RW
Detection
AV1 ✓
AV2 ✓
AV3 ✓ n.t.
AV4 ✓ n.t.
AV5 ✓
AV6 ✓
AV7 ✓
AV8 ✓ n.t.
AV9 ✓
AV10 ✓ n.t.
AV11 ✓ n.t.
AV12 ✓ n.t.
AV13 ✓
Left Click, x=1868, y=992 // Show Tray Icons
Right Click, x=1866, y=952 // Open AV's Menu
Move Cursor, x=1860, y=873 // Change Settings Submenu
Left Click, x=1700, y=877 // Real-Time Scan Settings
Left Click, x=1315, y=430 // Turn-off Button
Left Click, x=1280, y=555 // Verify Turn-off
Figure 3: Output of Collect, which sniffed the real user ac-
tions while disabling AV8.
For the duration of the deactivation, we used the default values
suggested by AVs to freeze their functions. The minimum length
is usually set to be 15 minutes, which is a sufficient time frame to
successfully conduct an effective attack. Here, the attackers could
also select an option that gives them a longer time-period.
6.3.2 Stopping Real-Time Protection. Using the information ob-
tained from Collect, we instrumented the recorded actions and
parameters into Control, which is used to exploit the specific AV
that we tested in each experiment. Next, we run Control and waited
until all the events are simulated.
If Control attack succeeds, a warning window appears which
notifies the user that the computer is not protected. In some ex-
periments, we even went further and simulated mouse clicks to
remove this notification window, which would be expected from a
real-world malware. This shows how this class of attacks can be
further extended to perform potentially more powerful malicious
actions.
As shown in the first column of Table 1, during our experiments
on 13 AV products, we detected that 6 AVs could be efficiently
deactivated by Ghost Control using our attack in §5. According to a
recent report by OPSWAT [24], the market share of AVs that are
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vulnerable to Ghost Control is at least 23%7. Furthermore, 4 of these
AVs have been frequently rated as “top product” in the reports of
AV-TEST. It is surprising for us that such a critical vulnerability,
arguably one of the worst that an AV might have, is found in such
a large share of AVs.
In the experiments in which Ghost Control was not able to suc-
cessfully disable the AV, we noticed that this was due to User Ac-
count Control (UAC) prompt, which uses MIC. In these cases, after
Ghost Control generated a click event to turn-off protection, UAC
notification appeared, which always runs with High IL. However,
since Ghost Control is a Medium IL process, it was not be able to
bypass UAC verification successfully.
7 DISCUSSION
Secure composability is a well known problem in security engi-
neering. It challenges developers to ensure that security properties
enjoyed by individual software components are preserved when the
components are put together. It also challenges them to demonstrate
that the components together give stronger security assurances
than just the mere sum of their original properties. This rarely
happens in practice, and the opposite is quite often true. Compo-
nents that, when taken in isolation, offer a certain known attack
surface do generate a wider surface when integrated into a system.
Intuitively this seems obvious. Components interact one another
and with other parts of the system create a dynamic with which
an attacker can interact too and in ways that were not foreseen by
the designer. An attacker can, for example, uses a component as an
oracle or replay its output to impersonate it while interacting with
another.
This is exactly what we have found happening to mechanisms
like UIPI and AV software. They provide a robust defense when
tested individually against a certain target, but the attacks that we
demonstrate in this paper show that their combination reveals new
vulnerabilities. We draw two considerations from it.
First, in complex systems it is essential to control the message-
flow between security critical components. This is actually enabled
by Microsoft via UIPI. It allows messages flowing from sender
applications to receiver applications only when the integrity level
of the first is not less than the integrity level of the second. In
principle, UIPI enables a good defence mechanism, but the problem
is that integrity levels do not reflect trust: theymerely indicate when
an application runs with administrative right (high), in standard
mode (medium), or in a sandbox (low). The authority who decides
which level an application takes is generally the operating system,
and sometimes the user, after a request from the application. It
may be, like in the scenario that we illustrated in Section 5, that
developers do not implement that request.
This is against what Microsoft Driver Security Guidance sug-
gests [20]: “It is important to understand that if lower privilege callers
are allowed to access the kernel, code risk is increased. [..] Following
the general least privilege security principle, configure only the mini-
mum level of access that is required for your driver to function.”. We
think that the process which controls the status of the anti-malware
and AV’s kernel module should be designed to require ‘high’ IL. Our
7We were not able to calculate the exact statistics as the shares of the 3 AVs that we
could stop are consolidated into "Others".
findings show that several anti-malware companies either failed
to follow this guidance or have misjudged the minimum level re-
quested for their security, or did not diversify enough between
kernel and non-kernel modules.
Secondly, and this is linked to our finding in Section 4, relying
only on integrity levels is not sufficient to ensure system security.
This does not surprise, since UIPI has been designed to protect pro-
cesses, and in fact anti-malware applications top-up their defence
strategy relying on whether an application is whitelisted, that is,
trusted. Only trusted applications can e.g., access protected files.
But, our findings have revealed a dissonance here: medium integrity
level applications, like Notepad, are considered trusted and thus al-
lowed to e.g., access protected files. But an application with medium
integrity level, that is running with standard user rights, does not
necessarily behave in a benign manner. As we showed for the case
of Notepad, medium but untrusted applications, such as malware,
can have their actions looking like be trusted by using the appli-
cation as a puppet; in so doing, they can bypass the anti-malware
guard.
We think that a better defence is to combine the integrity levels
and the trust label used by anti-malware.We state it as the following
principle:
Security Principle 1. Messages between applications should be
allowed only when the sender has at least the same integrity level as
the receiver and and the sender is at least as trusted as the receiver.
Principle 1 reminds the renowned Bell and La Padula Model
on messages-flow between different security “clearence” levels [6]
(see also [28]). But it is not exactly the same, since we cope with
“security” instead of confidentiality. Attempting a formalization of
Principle 1, components should be classified by “security levels”,
made of two elements: the UIPI “integrity levels”, (I = [admin ,
user, or sandbox], ordered) and the anti-virus software’s “trust
levels” (T = [digitally signed / whitelisted, not digitally signed / not
whitelisted], also ordered). Principle 1 suggests a policy saying that
an application of security level (I ,T ) should not accept messages
coming from applications of security level (I ′,T ′) when (I ′ < I ), or
when (I ′ ≥ I ) but (T ′ < T ′).
In conclusion, we believe that applying Principle 1 would have
prevented receiving SendInput from effecting whitelisted applica-
tions that has a potential to be exploited, e.g., Notepad. One should,
however, evaluate whether this may also broke some of the existing
automation software solutions. A conclusive statement about this
would require to perform a wide spread test on automation appli-
cations. It also had fostered AV vendors take measures not only to
protect the system, but also to protect their AV programs against
other supposedly trusted applications, in addition to conventional
malware attacks against AV products. A practical fix is to configure
AV kernel module to require admin rights to be accessed. In this
regard, it might be helpful to monitor SendInput API and block all
simulated keyboard and mouse events dispatched to AV program
although the problem of understanding whether a low-level event,
such as an interrupt, has been generated by a human or not might
be difficult to solve in general.
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8 RELATEDWORK
In this section, first we review existing attacks involving simulated
inputs to perform malicious actions. Next, we outline previous
research on the security of antivirus software.
8.1 Attacks Related to Input Simulation
Input simulation is the practice of programmatically synthesiz-
ing input events, such as mouse clicks or key strokes, which are
typically performed by the user. This section describes some the
most powerful existing attack techniques that make use of input
simulation.
8.1.1 Ghost Clicks. In [30], Springall et al. developed a proof-of-
concept malware to manipulate votes in Estonian Internet Voting
system. On infected clients, the malware simulates keyboard inputs
to activate the electronic identifier (e-ID) of voters and submit a
vote in a hidden session that is invisible to the voters.
Recently, under a different threat model, in [18] Maruyama et
al. demonstrate a method to generate tap events on touch screens
of smart phones using electromagnetic waves. In this scenario, the
victim’s device can be forced to pair with a malicious Bluetooth
device once it gets in the range of the attackers. Even if the victim
denies the pairing by choosing CANCEL in the security prompt, the
attacker can alter this selection and make the OS to recognize user
input as CONNECT.
Pay-per-click advertising systems are also vulnerable to fake
clicks, which is known as Click Fraud [31]. In these systems, the
advertisers get paid according to the number of clicks on adver-
tisements. By generating fraudulent clicks on the ads, a malicious
advertiser can increase its payment.
Perhaps the attack closest to the one described in this paper
is Synthetic Clicks [21], credited to Patric Wardle [11]. Exploiting
a bug in macOS OS, the attacker could send programmatically-
created mouse clicks events to security prompts that would result
in vertical privilege escalation. This way the attacker could cause
any damage, including retrieving all of the user’s passwords stored
in the keychain. Our attacks, Cut-and-Mouse and Ghost Control,
target Windows OS, do not rely upon a bug in the OS, and can
be used to instruct a privileged application to perform different
malicious operations.
8.1.2 Reprogramming USB Firmware. In [22], Nohl et al. demon-
strated that it is feasible to modify the firmware of a USB device, for
instance a USB stick, to behave like a keyboard. Known as BadUSB,
this technique works by reprogramming the device’s firmware in
order to type commands on the victim’s computer. When plugged
into a computer, the malicious USB device can simulate the key
strokes of the user, for example, type and execute a script which
downloads and runs a malware.
8.1.3 Shatter Attack. In [3], Paget describes a weakness in Win-
dows OS that allow a process to inject arbitrary code into another
process and execute. The “shatter attack”, a term coined by Paget,
works as follows: first, the malware copies the code-to-be-injected
to the clipboard. Next, it sends WM_PASTE message to target process
to paste the clipboard contents into a text field on the GUI of the
target process. At this point, the malicious code has been moved
onto the memory space of the target process. To execute this code,
the malware process sends another window message, a carefully
crafted WM_TIMER message, which causes a jump to the address of
the malicious code. The main difference with our attacks is the
presence of the malicious code during the injection, while with
Cut-and-Mouse we use and control a privileged application as a
"puppet" to perform various operations without injecting new code
into the target process memory.
8.2 Previous Research on Security of AVs
Traditionally, AVs have been in the target of security researchers
due to their incomparable importance. Since AV vendors mostly
utilize blacklisting as the main defense technique, many researchers
investigated this area. For instance, [9] and [29] analyzed the feasi-
bility of evade detection via obfuscation.
Another significant research topic about AVs is the implemen-
tation related vulnerabilities. To name a few examples: [15, 16, 25,
26, 32]. That said, the discoveries in this field mostly involve the
bugs in the AV software, rather than a flaw in their design or threat
model.
Finally, in [2], Al-Saleh and Crandall developed a technique to
determine if the target AV is up-to-date using side channel analy-
sis, allowing the attacker to learn which signatures exists in virus
database of the victim.
9 CONCLUSIONS
Antivirus programs (AVs) have become one of the de facto computer
security standards. Recently, they have also integrated ransomware
detection modules. There has been quite an attention to this class of
malware, given its world-wide impact; therefore, interested to know
how current AVs can mitigate the threat, we started to dive into
the matter. What we found is indeed surprising. Despite the great
attention to security that AV companies put into their products, the
security issues we discovered are in the interaction between OS
defences and AV defences.
Precisely, we found that it is possible for a malicious program
to (i) turn off AV’s real-time scanning protection feature; and (ii)
bypass anti-ransomware protected folder solutions by misusing
whitelisted applications to encrypt user data. To this end, we have
discussed and provided two proof-of-concept programs, Ghost Con-
trol and Cut-and-Mouse, which were able to either disable several
off-the-shelf AVs or bypass their anti-ransomware feature. We be-
lieve that the two issues can be fixed and avoided in the future, but
this requires software developers to have a general understanding of
what caused them. We stated that understanding in our Principle 1.
One could question whether such attacks can be detected by
the human user’s seeing, e.g., the mouse icon clicking here and
there. However, we believe that making security dependent on the
user’s reaction is fundamentally a wrong design choice, as user may
indeed enlarge the attack surface; in addition, malware can perform
these attacks when the user is not using the computer, e.g., through
some heuristic based on user’s activities. Thus a better mitigation
solution would be aimed at understanding whether keyboard and
mouse events come from a legitimate user or whether instead they
are synthesized by a (malicious) program. In a sense, discerning
such situation is what malware is already trying to achieve, namely
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understanding if it is running in a sandbox, e.g., using reverse Tur-
ing tests to detect the presence (or absence) of a human, – this
further reinforces the analogy of attackers and defenders are each
learning from others. However, before that discernment becomes
possible, OS and AV defences have to cooperate better. At the root
of our findings there is a misalignment between two different con-
cepts: that of integrity levels used by the OS, and that of trusted
applications on which instead AV defences rely upon. They have
not been conceived to work together and, at a higher level, they
have to be harmonized. This is indeed what our Principle 1 means
to achieve. We will attempt a synthesis of the two concepts by
developing a proof-of-concept component that implements it, thus
creating a test-bed for the validity of the Principle itself, which is
one of our future research works.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was partially funded by European Union’s Horizon 2020
research and innovation programme under grant agreement No
779391 (FutureTPM) and by Luxembourg National Research Fund
(FNR) under the project PoC18/13234766-NoCry PoC.
REFERENCES
[1] Mohsen Ahmadvand, Alexander Pretschner, and Florian Kelbert. 2019. A tax-
onomy of software integrity protection techniques. In Advances in Computers.
Vol. 112. Elsevier, Cambridge, MA, USA, 413–486.
[2] Mohammed I. Al-Saleh and Jedidiah R. Crandall. 2011. Application-level Recon-
naissance: Timing Channel Attacks Against Antivirus Software. In Proceedings of
the 4th USENIX Conference on Large-scale Exploits and Emergent Threats (LEET’11).
USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 9.
[3] Chris Paget (alias Foon). 2002. Exploiting design flaws in the Win32 API for
privilege escalation. Retrieved May 15, 2019 from https://web.archive.org/web/
20060904080018/http://security.tombom.co.uk/shatter.html
[4] Hyrum S. Anderson, Anant Kharkar, Bobby Filar, David Evans, and Phil Roth.
2018. Learning to Evade Static PE Machine Learning Malware Models via Rein-
forcement Learning. arXiv:cs.CR/1801.08917
[5] AV-TEST. 2019. The best antivirus software for Windows Home User. Retrieved
June 10, 2019 from https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/home-windows/
[6] D. E. Bell and L. J. La Padula. 1976. Secure computer system: Unified exposition
and Multics interpretation. Technical Report ESD-TR-75-306. Mitre Corporation.
[7] Battista Biggio and Fabio Roli. 2018. Wild Patterns: Ten Years After the Rise of
Adversarial Machine Learning. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’18). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
2154–2156. https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3264418
[8] Iker Burguera, Urko Zurutuza, and Simin Nadjm-Tehrani. 2011. Crowdroid:
Behavior-based Malware Detection System for Android. In Proceedings of the 1st
ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices (SPSM
’11). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 15–26. https://doi.org/10.1145/2046614.2046619
[9] Mihai Christodorescu and Somesh Jha. 2004. Testing malware detectors. ACM
SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes 29, 4 (2004), 34–44.
[10] Ian Goodfellow, Patrick McDaniel, and Nicolas Papernot. 2018. Making Machine
Learning Robust Against Adversarial Inputs. Commun. ACM 61, 7 (June 2018),
56–66. https://doi.org/10.1145/3134599
[11] Andy Greenberg. 2019. Another Mac Bug Lets Hackers Invisibly Click Security
Prompts. Retrieved June 10, 2019 from https://www.wired.com/story/apple-
macos-bug-synthetic-clicks/
[12] IT Services of Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 2017. Technology No-
tice – Disable Antivirus before using Examplify. Retrieved May
31, 2019 from https://mitchellhamline.edu/technology/2017/12/03/technology-
notice-disable-antivirus-before-using-examplify/
[13] S. Josefsson. 2006. The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings. RFC 4648. RFC
Editor. http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648.txt http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/
rfc4648.txt.
[14] Dhilung Kirat and Giovanni Vigna. 2015. MalGene: Automatic Extraction of
Malware Analysis Evasion Signature. In Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’15). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 769–780.
[15] Joxean Koret. 2014. Breaking Antivirus Software. Retrieved June 10, 2019 from
http://joxeankoret.com/download/breaking_av_software_44con.pdf
[16] Joxean Koret. 2016. AV: Additional Vulnerabilities. Retrieved June 10, 2019 from
https://www.hoystreaming.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/hb_bilbo.pdf
[17] Joxean Koret and Elias Bachaalany. 2015. The Antivirus Hacker’s Handbook. John
Wiley & Sons, Indianapolis, IN, USA.
[18] S. Maruyama, S. Wakabayashi, and T. Mori. 2019. Tap ’n Ghost: A Compilation
of Novel Attack Techniques against Smartphone Touchscreens. In 2019 2019 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos,
CA, USA, 628–645.
[19] Alana Maurushat. 2013. Disclosure of Security Vulnerabilities: Legal and Ethical
Issues. Springer-Verlag London, London.
[20] Microsoft. 2019. Driver security checklist. Retrieved June
10, 2019 from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/
driversecurity/driver-security-checklist
[21] NIST. 2017. NVD – CVE-2017-7150. Retrieved June 10, 2019 from https:
//nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7150
[22] Karsten Nohl, Sascha Krißler, and Jakob Lell. 2014. BadUSB—On accessories that
turn evil. Retrieved May 15, 2019 from https://srlabs.de/wp-content/uploads/
2014/07/SRLabs-BadUSB-BlackHat-v1.pdf
[23] Working Group Dual Use of the Flemish Interuniversity Council. 2017. Guidelines
for researchers on dual use and misuse of research.
[24] OPSWAT. 2019. Windows Anti-malware Market Share Report. Retrieved June
10, 2019 from https://metadefender.opswat.com/reports/anti-malware-market-
share#!/
[25] Tavis Ormandy. 2015. Analysis and Exploitation of an ESET Vulnerability.
Retrieved June 10, 2019 from https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/06/
analysis-and-exploitation-of-eset.html
[26] Tavis Ormandy. 2016. How to Compromise the Enterprise Endpoint. Re-
trieved June 10, 2019 from https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/how-
to-compromise-enterprise-endpoint.html
[27] TaxSlayer Pro. 2017. Quick Start Manual. Retrieved June 10, 2019 from http:
//downloads.taxslayer.com/online/2017-Quick-Start-Manual.pdf
[28] John Rushby. 1986. The Bell and La Padula Security Model. Computer Science
Laboratory, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA. Draft Technical Note.
[29] Monirul I. Sharif, Andrea Lanzi, Jonathon T. Giffin, and Wenke Lee. 2008. Imped-
ing Malware Analysis Using Conditional Code Obfuscation.
[30] Drew Springall, Travis Finkenauer, Zakir Durumeric, Jason Kitcat, Harri Hursti,
Margaret MacAlpine, and J. Alex Halderman. 2014. Security Analysis of the Esto-
nian Internet Voting System. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’14). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
703–715.
[31] Kenneth C. Wilbur and Yi Zhu. 2009. Click Fraud. Marketing Science 28, 2 (2009),
293–308.
[32] Feng Xue. 2008. Attacking Antivirus. Retrieved June 10, 2019
from https://blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-08/Feng-Xue/Presentation/
bh-eu-08-xue.pdf
[33] Feng Xue. 2008. Attacking The Antivirus.
[34] Heng Yin, Dawn Song, Manuel Egele, Christopher Kruegel, and Engin Kirda.
2007. Panorama: Capturing System-wide Information Flow for Malware De-
tection and Analysis. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (CCS ’07). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 116–127.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1315245.1315261
[35] Ilsun You and Kangbin Yim. 2010. Malware Obfuscation Techniques: A Brief
Survey. In International Conference on Broadband, Wireless Computing, Com-
munication and Applications (BWCCA ’10). IEEE, Piscataway, New Jersey, US,
4.
